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The Deportation of ‘Virtual
National’ Offenders: The Impact of
the ECHR and EU Law
Elspeth Berry*
1 The protection currently afforded by human rights law
Article 8 ECHR provides, inter alia, that everyone within the jurisdiction of a Contracting
State to the ECHR, regardless of his nationality, has the right to respect for his private and
family life. This may not be interfered with except as is in accordance with the law and
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of one of the legitimate aims set out in art 8(2).
The Court of Human Rights held in Boultif v Switzerland 3 that a balance must be struck
At a glance
The right of criminal offenders to respect for their family and personal lives is often in
conflict with the right of the public to be protected against their criminal behaviour.
When those offenders are foreign nationals, their rights are liable to be affected not only
by imprisonment, but by subsequent deportation to their country of nationality.
This article first discusses the current level of ECHR and EU law protection1 against
deportation of ‘virtual nationals’2, that is to say non-nationals who were born or raised in
the host State. While foreign nationals born in the host State are easily identified, those
regarded as raised there have not been precisely defined by any of the authorities discussed
below, and it would perhaps be unnecessary and unwise to do so given that such an
assessment must turn on the facts. However, such persons will generally have immigrated
before the age of 16 and spent a significant proportion of their life in the host State at the
time that deportation is considered. This discussion demonstrates that the law lacks
proportionality and certainty in this area, and discriminates against offenders who are
virtual nationals.
Second, the possibility of greater protection for these virtual national offenders is
examined. Finally, it is argued that greater protection would address the criticisms of the
current law, and have a number of significant advantages.
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between an applicant’s Article 8 rights and the legitimate interests of the State in assessing the
proportionality of expulsion. This balance must take into account factors indicating the risk
posed by the applicant – the nature and seriousness of the offence committed, and the period
which had elapsed since the commission of the offence and his conduct during that period; and
factors indicating his integration in the host State – the duration of his stay there, his family
circumstances, the nationality of the various persons concerned, and the seriousness of the
difficulties which any spouse or children would face in the country of origin.
However, while these factors may allow virtual nationals to demonstrate a strong case
against expulsion on release from prison, they do not provide absolute protection. Three
particular areas of the Court’s jurisprudence militate against permitting virtual national
offenders to remain in the host State, and will now be considered.
a) The relationship between adult offenders and their families
First, it is clear from the Court’s ruling in Advic v UK4 that only exceptionally will the right to
family life under art 8 be engaged by a relationship between an adult and a parent or adult
siblings. An example of such an exceptional case is Chindamo v SSHD5, a case involving the
attempted deportation of an Italian national who had lived in the UK since childhood and who
had been convicted and imprisoned for the murder of the headteacher Phillip Lawrence. The
tribunal held that the impact of Chindamo’s long term imprisonment from his teenage years
onwards had prevented him leading an independent life when he turned 18, so that his family
ties remained ‘fundamentally important to his private and social existence beyond his
eighteenth birthday’ and therefore art 8 was engaged.
However, the application of Advic will generally result in the impact of deportation on the
family life of a virtual national being underestimated. Deportation will consequently be judged
proportionate to the interference with family life when, in reality, it is not. Virtual national
offenders will thus be discriminated against when compared to offenders with similar ties to the
host State but who happen to be its own nationals.
b) The seriousness of the threat posed by the offender
Second, determination of the proportionality of deportation requires an assessment of the
seriousness of the threat posed by the offender on release from prison. Thus, in Moustaquim v
Belgium6 the Court noted that Moustaquim’s numerous offences of theft were committed
during adolescence and none had been committed during the nearly two years between his
release from detention and his deportation. In Boultif 7 it noted that Boultif presented only a
comparatively limited danger to public order. However, in many cases, it bases its judgment on
the nature of the offence(s) and the length of the sentence, rather than the actual threat posed
by the applicant on release. For example, in Boughanemi v France8 it noted ‘[a]bove all’ that
Boughanemi had been sentenced to almost four years imprisonment for serious offences, and
did not analyse the risk he actually posed on release9. This approach could result in the
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deportation of a virtual national being judged proportionate to the crime when in fact it is
disproportionate to the actual risk posed. The inconsistency in the jurisprudence in this area
also diminishes legal certainty.
c) The balance between family and personal life
Third, although art 8 refers both to private and family life, the Court does not always take into
account the full extent or absence of both of these factors in each of the host and receiving
States, tending to focus on family life in the host State and potential personal life in the
receiving State. In some cases, this is nonetheless sufficient to protect virtual nationals. For
example, the Court concluded in Moustaquim10 that deportation was a disproportionate breach
of Moustaquim’s family life, given that he had lived in Belgium since the age of two, with or
near his family, and had only returned to Morocco for a couple of holidays. In Nasri v France11
it held that the deportation of an Algerian who had lived in France since the age of five would
breach his right to a family life. Although he had committed a variety of serious offences,
including rape, he was deaf and mute and therefore ‘capable of achieving a minimum
psychological and social equilibrium only within his family’, the majority of whom were
French with no close ties to Algeria.
However, for many virtual national offenders this approach presents a misleading picture
of their situation and can result in a deportation which has a disproportionate impact on their
private and family life taken as whole. For example, in Boughanemi12 the Court held that
although Boughanemi had lived in France from the age of eight and his parents and siblings
lived there, as did his child, there was no evidence of a close relationship with his parents or
siblings, or of any relationship with his child. However, he had kept his Tunisian nationality,
spoke Arabic, had other ties with Tunisia and had returned there after deportation, although he
subsequently returned illegally to France. His deportation was therefore judged proportionate.
While it is clearly legitimate for the Court to take account of the fact that he had little family
life in France and could (perhaps) establish a personal life in Tunisia, it is submitted that his
limited family life in France should have been set against its complete absence in Tunisia, and
the possibility of a personal life in Tunisia should have been weighed against his actual personal
ties in France13.
The Court’s approach denies the reality that virtual nationals of the deporting State will
have both a personal and a (possibly limited) family life there, which should be fully considered
in relation to art 8. Indeed, a number of its own judges have criticised this aspect of its
jurisprudence. For example, Judge Morenilla has deprecated the ‘formalistic’ approach of the
Court in focussing on interference with family rather than private life, ‘a general concept of
which family life is one element’14. Judge Wildhaber has argued that the Court’s reliance only
on family life is ‘somewhat artificial’, and that it would be ‘more realistic to look at the whole
social fabric which is important to the applicant, and the family as only one part of the entire
context’15. As Judge Martens has argued, private life comprises the totality of all social ties, and
02-IANL (23-1)-cpp:02-IANL (23-1)-cpp  23/9/09  07:53  Page 13
16 Concurring Opinion in Beljoudi v France (1992) 14 EHRR 801 and Dissenting Opinion in Boughenami, op. cit. note 8.
17 [2004] OJ L158/77.
18 Article 27 of the Directive.
19 Article 28 of the Directive.
20 Op. cit. note 3.
21 See, for example Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department C-60/00[2002] ECR I-6279 and Secretary of State
for the Home Department v Akrich C-109/01 [2003] ECR I-9607.
14
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, Vol 23, No 1, 2009
although not all integrated aliens have a family life, all have a private life, and full consideration
of personal as well as family life would be in the interests of legal certainty16. This approach also
lacks transparency, since neither the Court of Human Rights nor the domestic courts have
made it explicit, and it is not justified by the text of art 8 itself. It is therefore unfortunate, both
for individual applicants and for the clarity and certainty of the law, that the Court has not
adopted a consistent approach across the cases.
2 The protection currently afforded by EU law
Directive 2004/3817 (‘the Directive’) provides that EU citizens and certain family members have
the right to reside in another Member State. By way of derogation, they may be expelled on
grounds of public policy, public security or public health. However, under art 16, those who
‘have resided legally for a continuous period of five years in the host Member State’ have the
right of permanent residence and may not be expelled except on ‘serious grounds of public
policy or public security’ while, under art 28, an EU citizen who has resided in the host Member
State for the previous ten years may not be expelled except on ‘imperative grounds of public
security’. Where reliance is placed on public policy, expulsion must be proportionate to the
threat and based solely on the personal conduct of the individual, previous criminal convictions
‘shall not in themselves constitute grounds’, the personal conduct of the individual must represent
a ‘genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of
society’18, and justification unrelated to the facts of the case or which relates to considerations
of general prevention cannot be accepted. The host State must also take into account factors
relevant to integration; the person’s age, state of health, family and economic situation, length
of residence, social and cultural integration, and links with his country of origin19, factors which
broadly reflect the Boultif criteria20. The Directive is further subject to the Court of Justice’s
recognition that the right to respect for private and family life is protected by EU law21.
There are a number of potential gaps in the protection offered by EU law to virtual
national offenders. First, and most obviously, it only applies to EU nationals and their family
members, and other integrated immigrants do not benefit from its protection. Second, although
there are three levels of protection against expulsion, none are absolute. Third, none take direct
account of whether the person was born or raised in the host State. Fourth, those convicted of
criminal offences are likely to have spent time in prison, and it is unclear whether such time can
count towards the residence periods that give rise to greater protection against deportation.
Fifth, at least one domestic court has implied a temporal restriction into the Directive and the
domestic legislation transposing it, introducing a further hurdle for applicants seeking
protection against expulsion. These latter two issues will be considered in more detail.
a) The impact of imprisonment
In the absence of a ruling from the Court of Justice, it is not clear whether time in prison counts
towards the five or ten years’ residence which give rise to greater rights under the Directive. In
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MG and VC (EEA Regulations 2006; ‘conducive’ deportation) Ireland v SSHD22 the tribunal ruled
that it did, and in HB v SSHD23 and LG (Italy) v SSHD24 the government accepted this.
However, in Chindamo25 the tribunal held that time in prison could not count towards the
calculation of residence under the Directive, and in HB26 the Court of Appeal doubted the
correctness of the government’s concession that it could, although neither court put forward
wider justifications for this view beyond the technical interpretation of EU law.
It is submitted that, as a matter of law, time in prison should count towards such
residence. First, it is sufficient that the offender remains physically resident in the Member
State. Indeed, the Directive does not exclude imprisonment from the calculation of residence.
Second, if physical presence alone is insufficient, it may be argued that an offender
exercises Treaty rights to reside while in prison. For example, an offender under the age of 21
has the right of residence if either parent is an EU national, and older offenders have the right
of residence if they remain dependant on an EU national parent27. It has been made clear by the
Court of Justice in Centre Public d’Aide Sociale de Courcelles v Lebon28 that it is the fact of
dependency which is essential, not the reasons for it. Indeed, as mentioned above, in
Chindamo29 the applicant was held to be dependant on his mother precisely because his
imprisonment at a young age had prevented him establishing other personal ties.
It is also possible, although unlikely, that a prisoner could be held to be exercising Treaty
rights by being a worker while in prison. In Bettray v Staatsecretaris van Justitie30 the Court of
Justice ruled that activities merely designed to rehabilitate or reintegrate a person would not be
regarded as a genuine economic activity so as to render him a worker within the test laid down
in Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg31, requiring the performance of services for or at the
direction of another in return for remuneration. However, in Trojani v Centre Public d’Aide
Sociale de Bruxelles32 it confined Bettray to its facts. It stated that the issue was whether the paid
activity in question (employment for 30 hours per week by a charity as part of a personal
reintegration programme in return for benefits in kind and pocket money) was real and
genuine. However, this appears unlikely to be sufficient to include a prisoner, at least in the
view of the English courts. In OA (Prisoner – not a qualified worker) Nigeria v Secretary of State for
the Home Department33 a non-EU national spouse of a EU national was held not to be entitled
to a residence permit because the latter was serving a prison sentence and was therefore not a
worker for the purposes of EU law. Trojani was not cited, but the tribunal noted Bettray and
stated that there were other differences in the nature of prison work, in addition to its
rehabilitative function. These included lack of entitlement to remuneration, employment
protection rights or the minimum wage, lack of any right to work or to choose the location or
the opportunities to work, the inapplicability of PAYE and NI contributions, and the
invidiousness of drawing any distinction between different types of work in prison according to
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whether it resulted in output which was sold outside the prison for profit or not. It concluded
‘We do not consider that any serving prisoner is a worker’34.
Third, it is possible for previously acquired Treaty rights to be retained while in prison,
and it is submitted that this indicates that this period can count towards the calculation of
residence. In Orfanopoulos and Oliveri35 the Court of Justice held that a prisoner who was
previously employed did not cease to be a member of the workforce simply because he was not
available for employment during imprisonment, provided that he found another job within a
reasonable time after release. A similar approach has been taken in relation to the rights of
Turkish workers under the corresponding legislation, Decision 1/80 of the Association
Council on the development of the Association between the European Community and
Turkey36.
Furthermore, it is not only worker status that can be retained despite imprisonment. In
Orfanopoulos and Oliveri37 the Court of Justice held that although Oliveri’s economic status was
unclear, he had as a minimum the right to move and reside freely within the Member States as
a result of his EU citizenship, and had retained that status during imprisonment. In Aydinli38 it
held that a family member of a Turkish worker, who had acquired rights under Decision 1/80
because he had resided legally in Germany for five years and undertaken vocational training
there, had not forfeited them as a result of prolonged absence from the labour market due to
imprisonment, even for a period of several years followed by long-term drug treatment.
Furthermore, if the argument of the tribunals in Chindamo and OA prevails, there would
be a further consequence, presumably unintended and certainly disproportionate. This is that
those detained pending trial, but against whom charges are dropped or who are acquitted or
given a non-custodial sentence, would suffer the loss of their rights in the same way as those
given a custodial sentence by order of a court.
b) Temporal restrictions on the acquisition of residence rights
A European Commission official has confirmed that ‘the Directive does not provide for the
condition that the five year residence has to be “on the basis of the Directive”’ and that
requiring persons to wait for five years after entry into force of the Directive ‘would be an
additional condition not foreseen in the text’39. Similarly, the European Commission states that
‘all you need is five years of continuous legal residence in the host Member State’ and that the
right is also acquired by ‘family members who have legally resided with you’, without any
requirement that this residence take place after entry into force of the Directive40.
Despite this, in Chindamo41 the tribunal held that paragraph 17 of the Preamble to the
Directive, which refers to residence in the host Member State ‘in compliance with the
conditions laid down in this Directive’, meant that the five years’ residence had to be acquired
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subsequent to its coming into force in 2004. However, although a Preamble can be used to
interpret the operative part of a Directive, the Court of Justice has held that it ‘has no binding
legal force and cannot be relied on as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the
[Directive]’42. It is submitted that it should therefore be treated with considerable caution where
it appears to say something that the provisions of the Directive do not.
The tribunal in Chindamo noted that the Immigration (European Economic Area)
Regulations 200643 transpose the Directive with the qualification that permanent residence is
acquired only if the person has resided in the UK ‘in accordance with these Regulations for a
continuous period of five years’.44 However, the Court of Justice has made it clear that national
law may not make EU rights subject to the fulfilment of additional obligations45, and therefore
no restrictions on residence can be imposed which do not appear in the Directive.
Furthermore, the right not to be expelled after ten years’ residence except on imperative
grounds of public security is not made subject by the Regulations to any equivalent
requirement. Not only is there no reason why the extra qualification is read into the five year
provision but not the ten year provision, it would have the nonsensical result that a person not
regarded as having five years’ continuous legal residence, and thus unable to require the State
to prove serious grounds of public policy or public security in order to expel him, could
simultaneously be regarded as a person with ten years’ residence, able to resist expulsion except
on imperative grounds of public security.
2 Greater rights for virtual national offenders
In the light of the uncertainties and gaps in the current protection against deportation afforded
to virtual national offenders, there may be both moral and practical reasons for considering
them to be a distinct category of applicants who should benefit from greater protection against
deportation. However, before examining the advantages of greater protection, the extent to
which it can actually be provided must be discussed.
At present, a virtual national’s integration will weigh against expulsion when consideration
is given to the factors mandated by Boultif 46 (duration of stay, family circumstances, nationalities
concerned and the difficulties which the family would encounter in the country of origin) or
art 28 of the Directive (age, health, family and economic situation). The length of residence, if
it reaches five or ten years, may bestow additional protection under EU law. However, none
of these provisions take direct account of the fact that an applicant is a virtual national. Greater
rights could be provided either by granting this category of persons absolute protection against
expulsion or by improving the protection currently on offer to them.
a) Absolute protection
Absolute protection against the expulsion of virtual national offenders would be the simplest
approach, provide the maximum protection and make the greatest contribution to fairness and
consistency in the application of the law (discussed below). It has been advocated by the
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Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which has recommended the
drafting of a Protocol to guarantee that those born or brought up in the host State cannot be
expelled under any circumstances47. It argues that long-term immigrants are ‘no longer
humanly or sociologically foreigners’, so that expulsion would be disproportionate and
discriminatory. A similar view is taken by the European United Left/Nordic Green Left Group
in the EU Parliament (GUE/NGL), which argues for ‘civic citizenship’ based on residence
rather than nationality48. However, the Court of Human Rights recently stated in Üner v
Netherlands49 that no absolute right not to be expelled could be derived from art 8, given the
derogations available in art 8(2), and that a State was entitled to control the entry and residence
of aliens into its territory ‘regardless of whether an alien entered the host country as an adult or
at a very young age, or was perhaps even born there’. As a matter of EU law, as discussed above,
the Directive expressly permits the expulsion of those with permanent residence rights and
even of those who have resided in the host State for ten years.
The current political climate must also be recognised. In 2006, British Home Secretary
Charles Clarke was sacked after it emerged that over a thousand foreign offenders had been
released from prison without being considered for deportation50. The judgment in Chindamo51,
that an Italian national convicted of a high profile murder as a teenager should not be deported
after serving his sentence, was greeted with considerable public hostility, reflecting wider
concerns with teenage violence52 and immigrant criminality53. The reaction to such protection
may also reflect a degree of hostility in some quarters to the obligations attaching to UK
membership of the EU54, and those arising from the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporating the
ECHR55.
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The widow of Chindamo’s victim said ‘We’ve always been given the impression that he
would be deported’56 and Jack Straw, Justice Secretary, admitted ‘She is entirely right to say that
was her expectation – it was mine too’57. This was despite the fact that Chindamo had at least
an arguable case under the ECHR and EU law to remain in the UK, and s33 of the UK
Borders Act 2007 provides that the automatic deportation of non-British citizens convicted of
a serious criminal offence cannot apply where deportation would breach the person’s EU law
rights or the ECHR58.
b) Improved protection
Even if absolute protection were to be unacceptable at present, it would still be possible to
improve the protection of virtual national offenders against deportation by addressing the
criticisms of the ECHR and EU law outlined above. However, in order to provide further
protection, it is submitted that a presumption should operate against deportation of virtual
nationals, to be displaced only where the threat which they pose to public security on release
from prison is so great that it outweighs the significant infringement of their personal and family
life which expulsion from their only real home will entail. Such an approach has been suggested
by a number of judges of the Court of Human Rights. In his Dissenting Opinion in
Boughenami, Judge Martens advocated a general acceptance that expulsion of integrated aliens
interfered with their private life, and could be justified only exceptionally, where the alien was
convicted of ‘very serious crimes, such as serious crimes against the State, political or religious
terrorism or holding a leading position in a drug trafficking organisation’59. In their Joint
Dissenting Opinion in Baghli v France60, Judges Costa and Tulkens concluded that exclusion
orders should only be imposed ‘with caution and for a very good reason’ on virtual nationals.
Similarly, in her Dissenting Opinion in Bouchelkia v France61, Judge Palm argued that ‘As a rule,
second-generation migrants ought to be treated in the same way as nationals’, despite criminal
behaviour. This approach would also be consistent with the Directive, which permits the
expulsion of the most integrated EU nationals only on imperative grounds of public security62.
Both the Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice have accepted the principle
that integrated aliens should be afforded greater rights than other aliens, as have the EU
legislature and the UK Home Office63. The Court of Human Rights has confirmed that the
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ECHR is a ‘living instrument’64 and although a majority of Contracting Parties permit the
deportation of second generation immigrants convicted of a criminal offence, at least eight now
provide protection against this, of which six provide protection also to those raised but not
born there65. It has also explicitly recognised the significance of the applicant having lived in the
host State since birth or early childhood in determining the proportionality of deportation. For
example, in both C v Belgium66 and Dalia v France67 it commented that the deportation of the
applicants, who had arrived in the host States at the ages of eleven and 17 or 18 respectively,
was ‘not so drastic’ as it would be for applicants born there or who had first gone there as young
children. In Mokrani v France68, in relation to an applicant born in France who had lived there
for most of his life, had all his schooling there, and whose parents and siblings lived there, it
noted that
‘the particular ties which these immigrants have forged with the host country in which
they have lived most of their lives must also be taken into account. They have received
their education there and have made most of their social ties there and have therefore
developed their own identities there. Born or having arrived in the host country as a
result of their parents’ immigration, their closest family ties are often there. The only link
some of these immigrants have maintained with the country of their birth is their
nationality’.
Some judges have gone even further; Judges De Meyer69 and Morenilla70 have argued that
deportation of an integrated alien would constitute inhuman treatment contrary to art 3 ECHR71.
The principle that integrated immigrants should receive greater protection against
deportation is also established in EU law. In Orfanopoulos and Oliveri72 the Court of Justice noted
that deportation of an EU national from a country where members of his close family were
living could disproportionately breach his right to a family life and that, in assessing the
proportionality of deportation, account must be taken of the applicant’s general integration into
the host State. As discussed above, art 28 of the Directive requires any decision on expulsion to
be preceded by examination of a number of factors indicating integration. Paragraph 23 of the
Preamble notes that ‘Expulsion … can seriously harm persons who … have become genuinely
integrated into the host Member State’ and para 24 provides that ‘Accordingly, the greater the
degree of integration of Union citizens and their family members in the host Member State, the
greater the degree of protection against expulsion should be’. Similarly, Directive 2003/10973
mandates the grant of long-term resident status to third-country nationals who have resided
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legally and continuously in a Member State, and notes that long-term residence ‘is a key element
in providing economic and social cohesion, a fundamental objective of the Community’.
3 Advantages of greater protection
Greater protection of virtual nationals would have four key advantages. First, it would result in
a significant reduction in the number of disproportionate deportations. Second, it would
reduce the discrimination suffered by virtual national offenders compared to domestic
offenders, since they would no longer be subject to the additional penalty of deportation.
Third, it would improve legal certainty. Fourth, it would take account of the rehabilitation of
offenders and the unacceptability of simply exporting the threat which they might pose.
a) Proportionality
As argued above, the Court of Human Rights frequently fails to take full account of a virtual
national offender’s integration into the host State and lack of ties with the receiving State, or of
the threat which he actually poses on release. This results in deportations which are in truth
disproportionate being judged proportionate. The lack of clarity in EU law as to the impact of
imprisonment on residence rights could have similar results. Providing virtual national
offenders with great protection against deportation would reduce significantly, if not
completely abolish, instances of disproportionate deportation.
b) Non-discrimination
It is submitted that, as Judge Morenilla has argued, the treatment of offenders ‘should not …
differ according to the national origin of the parents in a way which – through deportation –
makes the sanction more severe in a clearly discriminatory manner’74. Judge Martens has stated
that, ‘mere nationality does not constitute an objective and reasonable justification for the
existence of a difference as regards expulsion’75. He pointed out that the principle had been
accepted in art 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)76
that ‘No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’ and that the
drafting history indicated that this implied a ban on excluding integrated aliens as well as
nationals. The Human Rights Committee of the UN has also noted that art 12(4) does not
distinguish between nationals and aliens but protects ‘close and enduring connections between
a person and a country’77. It argues that:
‘the scope of “his own country” is broader than the concept “country of his nationality”.
It is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, that acquired at birth or by
conferral; it embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or her special
ties to or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien’78.
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The Steering Committee for Human Rights of the Council of Europe considers that treating
long term immigrants differently from nationals is not discriminatory because they are
fundamentally in different situations, the latter having a right to abode and the former not79.
However, it is submitted that, as Judge Martens has argued, virtual nationals and nationals are
in substance in the same position, since they all have very close links to the host State where
they have been born or raised and where their families are established80.
c) Legal certainty
The difficulty of predicting the outcome in a given case is evident from the divergent outcomes
in factually similar cases such as those discussed above, for example Moustaquim81, Boultif82,
Nasri83 and Boughanemi.84 As Judge Martens has noted, the case by case approach to expulsion of
integrated aliens has resulted in ‘a lottery for national authorities and a source of embarrassment
for the Court’ and outcomes are ‘tainted with arbitrariness’85. The Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Demography of the PACE has made similar comments86. A presumption against
the deportation of virtual national offenders except in the most extreme circumstances, such as
those outlined by Judge Martens in his Dissenting Opinion in Boughenami87 discussed above,
would increase legal certainty and consistency.
d) Rehabilitation of offenders
Rehabilitation is important not only to the individual offender, but also to the State. It has the
potential to impact on both its criminal justice policy and, in the case of foreign offenders, its
relations with other States. As Judge Morenilla argued in his Partly Dissenting Opinion in
Nasri88, a host State is responsible for the social integration of immigrants and their children
who it has accepted ‘for reasons of [economic] convenience’, and
‘Where such social integration fails, and the result is anti-social or criminal behaviour, the
State is also under a duty to make provision for their social rehabilitation instead of
sending them back to their country of origin, which has no responsibility for the
behaviour in question and where the possibilities of rehabilitation in a foreign social
environment are virtually non-existent’.
A study has concluded that ‘Because of the immense obstacles to their successful reintegration
… foreign-born offenders who immigrated as children may be more of a destabilising element
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in their countries of origin than other criminal deportees’89, and that recidivism among
deported offenders constitutes a significant problem for a number of receiving countries. It is
submitted that the comity of nations should prevent a State from simply exporting the threat
posed by such offenders90.
It is possible to consider rehabilitation indirectly, when assessing the proportionality of
deportation to the offender’s integration according to the factors listed in Boultif 91 or art 28 of
the Directive. However, greater protection against deportation would make it more likely that
virtual nationals convicted of a crime would remain where their rehabilitation is best carried
out, in the host State.
4 Conclusion
It appears that there is little likelihood of virtual nationals convicted of crimes being given
absolute protection against expulsion. Yet is evident that the current state of the law results in
unfairness and unpredictability, as well as militating against the rehabilitation of offenders. The
position could be improved were the courts to consider more carefully the actual threat posed
by the offender on release, and their personal and family ties in the host State, including those
with parents and adult siblings. It should also be made clear that time in prison must be taken
into account when calculating the length of residence in the host State for the purposes of EU
law. However, in order to achieve the maximum degree of fairness and certainty possible in the
prevailing climate, it is submitted that virtual nationals should be treated as just that – virtually
immune from expulsion save in the most extreme circumstances, such as those envisaged by
Judge Martens in Boughanemi92; serious crimes against the State, terrorism or a leading role in a
drug trafficking organisation.
Elspeth Berry, Senior Lecturer in Law
Nottingham Law School
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